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Killing for the state: the darkest side of 
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The aim of this article is to bring to the attention of the
international nursing community the discrepancy between a
pervasive ‘caring’ nursing discourse and a most unethical
nursing practice in the United States. In this article, we
present a duality: the conflict in American prisons between
nursing ethics and the killing machinery. The US penal
system is a setting in which trained healthcare personnel
practice the extermination of life. We look upon the sanitiza-
tion of deathwork as an application of healthcare professionals’
skills and knowledge and their appropriation by the state to
serve its ends. A review of the states’ death penalty statutes
shows that healthcare workers are involved in the capital
punishment process and shielded by American laws (and to
a certain extent by professional boards through their inac-
tion). We also argue that the law’s language often masks that
involvement; and explain how states further that duplicity
behind legal formalisms. In considering the important role
healthcare providers, namely nurses and physicians, play in
administering death to the condemned, we assert that
nurses and physicians are part of the states’ penal machinery
in America. Nurses and physicians (as carriers of scientific
knowledge, and also as agents of care) are intrinsic to the
American killing enterprise. Healthcare professionals who
take part in execution protocols are state functionaries who
approach the condemned body as angels of death: they con-
stitute an extension of the state which exercises its sovereign
power over captive prisoners.
Key words: capital punishment, caring, ethics, Foucault,
governmentality, nursing, power.
The scaffold, indeed, when it is prepared and set up, has the
effect of a hallucination … The scaffold is vision. The scaffold
is not a mere frame … not an inert piece of mechanism made
of wood, of iron, and of ropes. It seems a sort of being which
had some somber origin of which we can have no idea; one
could say that this frame sees, that this machine understands,
that this mechanism comprehends; that this wood, this iron,
and these ropes have a will. In the fearful reverie into which
its presence casts the soul, the awful apparition of the
scaffold confounds itself with its horrid work. The scaffold
becomes the accomplice of the executioner; it devours, it
eats flesh, and it drinks blood. The scaffold is a sort of
monster created by the judge and the workman, a specter
which seems to live with a kind of unspeakable life, drawn
from all the death which it has wrought. (Victor Hugo 1862)
The American rhetoric regarding human rights is inter-
nationally known and witnessed. Though describing itself as
the benchmark of freedom and human rights, the United
States of America violates several United Nations motions,
and thus international conventions and laws, regarding
human rights (Amnesty International 2002; Chomsky 1999).
The death penalty in the United States of America constitutes
one of the most blatant of these many violations. According
to Amnesty International (2002), the death penalty is the
ultimate denial of human rights because it violates the right
to life (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December
1948).
More than half of the countries in the world now forbid
the death penalty. Yet, the United States has accelerated
the rate of executing condemned inmates. Six people each
month are executed in the US, more than 800 since 1976
(as of 1 December 2002) and 3500 are on deathrow waiting
to die, some, for years. The United States, along with other
so-called human rights violators, as classified by the US
State Department (such as: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Chad,
China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen), continues to use
capital punishment. While some techniques used by certain
states are seen as barbaric (beheading, crucifixion, stoning),
some are considered ‘more humane’ (electrocution, hanging,
lethal injection).
Over 85% of executions recorded by Amnesty Inter-
national occurred in the United States, China and Saudi
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Arabia (Amnesty International 2002). Of juvenile offenders
executed, the United States executed half of them; Yemen,
Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran the other half
(Amnesty International 2002). Having said that, the ‘appa-
ratus’ of capital punishment in the United States relies on
several agents in order to fulfill its deathwork.
The aim of this article is to bring to the attention of the
international nursing community the discrepancy between a
pervasive ‘caring’ nursing discourse and a most unethical
nursing practice in the United States. In considering the
important role healthcare providers, namely nurses and
physicians, play in administering death to the condemned
(whether through care during the deathrow period, finding
veins for lethal injections or checking for vital signs of life
after the execution), we assert that nurses and physicians are
part of the states’ penal machinery in America (Bessler 1998;
Federman and Holmes 2000). Healthcare professionals who
take part in execution protocols are state functionaries who
approach the condemned body as angels of death. As such,
they constitute an extension of the state which exercises its
sovereign power over captive prisoners (Foucault 1977/1995;
Michalos 1997; Rothman 1995).
Our critical reflection is supported by official documents
from various healthcare professional statements (ACP
1994; ANA 1995; ICN 1991), and relies on the theoretical
literature regarding social control and governmentality
(Bergali and Sumner 1997; Dean 1999; Foucault 1977/1995,
1978/1990, 1991; Garland 1990; Ignatieff 1978; Rose and
Miller 1992). By treating prisoners as patients, and by partici-
pating in the state’s search for less disagreeable forms of
execution, nurses and physicians (as carriers of scientific
knowledge, and as agents of care) are intrinsic to the Amer-
ican killing enterprise.
HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
In this section, we describe the quest for knowledge that
drove elites to choose lethal injections over electricity, and to
replace hooded executioners with healthcare professionals.
But rather than explain lethal injection as an ‘unreality’
(Zimring and Hawkins 1986, 123) in American political life,
we focus on its utility and concrete reality.
By replacing the electric chair with a gurney and a
hooded executioner with a nurse or a physician, lethal injec-
tions offer the spectacle of calm (Federman and Holmes
2000). As Johnson (1990, 25) has written, ‘Executions today
are disturbingly, even chillingly, dispassionate’. For some, it
constitutes an improvement in the management of capital
punishment.
Lethal injections offer the promise of a humanitarian
solution to a criminal act, the cure for an ill, rather than the
threat of societal retribution or punishment. Their appeal
lies not in reducing pain to the prisoner, but in imposing a
‘medical veneer’ to the act of killing. By minimizing resist-
ance, the procedures of control are more total (Federman
and Holmes 2000, 446).
Social knowledge is the attempt by elites to gather informa-
tion for the purpose of managing social problems. Because
state actors possess knowledge and power, those who define,
shape, and respond to social problems exercise a degree of
autonomy over dominated economic groups. Ever since
academics and state elites recognized prisons as essential parts
of modern welfare states, prisons and prisoners have been
the subjects of scientific research. But too many studies of
capital punishment have failed to recognize that the pro-
cedures used to execute prisoners are ‘scientific’ forms of
knowledge. Penal studies often fall short of acknowledging
how ‘the system of capital punishment in the United States
today is shaped by its participants’ attempts to distance
themselves from the infliction of physical violence’ (Dubber
1996, 545). Studies of the death penalty repeatedly empha-
size the popular, legal, and juridical aspects of punishment,
at the expense of analyzing the relationships of power that
exist from below, for example, between the prisoner as
patient and caregivers as executioners within the prison.
The move toward lethal injections was not motivated
solely by humanitarian sentiment, but rather by ‘a desire on
the part of legislators to neutralize public opposition to the
death penalty after Gregg v. Georgia’ (Abernethy 1996, 408).
The development of the ‘long drop’, for example, made
hangings more efficient and less painful, and also helped to
insulate Washington state’s capital punishment statute from
constitutional attack (Campbell v. Wood 1994). Economics
also plays a role. The state of Texas lists the cost of a lethal
injection at $86.08 (Florida DOC 1999); Florida, by contrast,
which uses the electric chair, pays the person who throws the
switch $150.00 (Florida DOC 1999).
Focusing on the general public’s reaction directs atten-
tion away from the healthcare profession’s involvement with
the prisoner and his confinement, a relationship that is not
only hidden from public view, but is also legally protected.
Consequently, we regard the state’s interest in the way
capital punishment is practiced in more insular terms, as the
creation of autonomous state actors searching for econom-
ical and scientific ways to kill prisoners, perhaps in part, to
reduce pain, but overall to serve particular ends of control
and regulation, and to fulfill the state’s idea of punishment
as civilized (Spierenburg 1991). The autonomy of state actors
to make choices based on the amount of knowledge available
may be more significant than the public’s views of capital
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punishment. As both Foucault and Garland point out, the
internal discourses of penal institutions become cultural
symbols and have an effect on the public’s understanding
of punishment (Garland 1990; Foucault 1977/1995).
The need for lethal injections is less in the interest of the
public than of the state. The invention of the penitentiary
and the use of capital punishment in the United States are
more than the ‘byproducts of the intellectual and humani-
tarian movements of the eighteenth century that contrib-
uted so generously to the founding of the American nation’
(McKelvey 1977, 1). Taken together, the penitentiary and
capital punishment in the US constitute a unified (but
partial) story in the development of the state. Rejecting
the prison as a history of good intentions, we regard the
emergence of the penitentiary as ‘constitutive of liberal
democracy’ (Dumm 1987, 6). Jails, penitentiaries, and
prisons are the creations of autonomous state agents and
intellectuals using the available scientific and technological
knowledge concerning death, control, and discipline to
further dispossess prisoners, isolate them from the public,
and transform them. ‘The Enlightenment, which discovered
the liberties, also invented the disciplines’ (Foucault 1977/
1995, 222).
In dealing with the role of science (knowledge) in
politics, particularly in the execution process, we are less
concerned with knowledge ‘for what?’ than with knowledge
‘about what?’ (Katznelson 1996). That is, we are not trying
to understand the instrumental purpose of using nursing
and medical knowledges to hasten death, for its purpose
is clear. In liberal democracies such as the United States,
‘where knowledge is produced in an ethos of free competi-
tion’ (Scheingold 1998, 886), state actors need knowledge
about more humane methods of putting criminals to death
to alleviate any potential public outcry about the degree or
excessiveness of punishment (Savelsberg 1994). Thus,
although it is quite possible that lethal injections are as pain-
ful as electrocutions, and the ‘procedure becomes more …
problematic for the untrained executioner’ (Denno 1996,
381), support for the procedure is high because of its per-
ceived humanitarianism (Michalos 1997). As Ellsworth and
Gross (1994) point out, Americans support the death pen-
alty more out of moral concerns and prejudice than as a
method of control.
In the realm of penology, politics needs science and
healthcare practitioners to substitute the more repressive
methods of punishment and control with more palatable
techniques (and persons) because of the finality of punish-
ment and its effect on modern sensibilities. Yet what is miss-
ing in most surveys of the execution process is insight into
the multiple meanings and applications of the practitioners
of science with the practitioners of politics when they con-
verge around a gurney.
Medicalized penal procedures remove the state from the
language, if not the realm, of punishment. After witnessing
the first electrical execution in New York in 1890, Dr Alfred
Southwick, the inventor of the electric chair, said, ‘We live in
a higher civilization from this day’ (Amnesty International
1998). This kind of language is not uncommon among
American penal reformers. Since the Enlightenment, the
advance of social knowledge and the strengthening of the
state have been linked by ‘a compelling vision of progress’
(Rueschmeyer and Theda 1996, 299). As the Supreme
Court has noted, the replacement of hanging with electro-
cution ‘did not increase the punishment of murder, but only
changed its mode’ (Denno 1996, 336). Death by lethal injec-
tion is an extension of, and not a replacement for, death by
electrocution. More than denoting a new fusion of technol-
ogy and state power, medicalized penal procedures repre-
sent a new configuration in the relationship among the
state, its agents, and those in custody.
DECENTRALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT: 
FROM THE STATE TO PROFESSIONAL 
AGENTS
In the United States, the 37 states (except Nebraska) that still
sanction the death penalty use lethal injection as the primary
or secondary method of execution (Amnesty International
2002). The United States federal government and military
also use lethal injections as the sole method of execution.
Interestingly enough, 11 states deny that lethal injection is a
medical procedure, indemnify healthcare executioners
against legal harm, and shield their names from the public,
while other state laws are silent regarding execution proto-
cols. A Pennsylvania Department of Corrections fact sheet
on execution protocol, for example, states that:
The Department of Corrections engages the services of
individuals technically competent by virtue of training or
experience to carry out the lethal injection procedure....
The state does not identify injection team members
because of the confidentiality of the execution policy, for
security reasons and out of respect of the privacy of those
involved (PA DOC 1999).
New Jersey requires the prisoner to be ‘sedated by a licensed
physician, registered nurse, or other qualified personnel, by
either an oral tablet or capsule or an intramuscular injection
of a narcotic or barbiturate such as morphine, cocaine or
Demerol’ (NJ ST, 2C, 49–2). All other death penalty statutes
leave the administration of death to the warden or director
of corrections. Indeed, wardens or directors of corrections
Killing for the state
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are free to perform executions themselves, enlist healthcare
professionals to help, or use trained personnel to prepare
prisoners for death, insert needles, and regulate other med-
ical procedures. Although the healthcare personnel may be
nurses or physicians, they can also be physician’s assistants
(Campbell v. Wood 1994).
According to Garland, the focus of the new penology is
not just on the state but its agents, who act ‘indirectly’ in the
administration of criminal justice. The central state under
the new penology seeks ‘to activate action on the part of
non-state agencies and organizations’ (Garland 1996, 452)
by outsourcing ‘penological’ functions to private citizens
and agencies. The state relies on a web of government
agencies ‘to conduct the conduct’ of its citizens. Thus
government (which includes punishment techniques) is,
according to Rose and Miller (1992), ‘an active process
which joins political rationalities (more or less coherent
conceptions of the end of government, constituting a field
of legitimate intervention and expressed in a characteristic
axiom) with governmental technologies (practices and
techniques for the transformation of activities, conditions
and subjects in a field of intervention)’ (Curtis 1995, 575).
The state and the penal dispositif (apparatus), consequently,
no longer only punish — they administer, correct, discipline
and normalize.
Resentment, outrage, hatred, — as well as mercy, justice,
and forgiveness — continue to feature within these ration-
alized measures [of punishment]. But they do so in an
unexpressed, sublimated fashion, overlaid by a utilitarian
concern with institutional discipline and individual
management, so that even the most transparently punitive
actions are often represented in more ‘positive’, instrumental
terms (Garland 1990, 189).
Michel Foucault’s description of ‘governmentality’ helps us
to understand how the state governs beyond its official struc-
tures. Foucault (1991) never neglected the state, but stressed
that other apparatuses or institutions can ‘conduct the
conduct’ of citizens. Foucault stated that ‘governmentality’
should be understood as a powerful web of power relations
that links together three forms of powers: sovereign, discip-
linary, and pastoral (McNay 1994). The state as a sovereign
power remains an important actor. ‘The concept of govern-
mentality implies all those tactics, strategies, techniques,
programmes, dreams and aspirations of those authorities
that shape the beliefs and the conduct of the population’
(Nettleton 1991, 99).
Governing (which punishment is an integral part of)
today requires an active process in which the political ration-
alities bind themselves to the technologies of government.
The articulation of these two elements is ensured by a specific
form of knowledge (scientific) and the presence of an expert
(professional) who mediates between the political objectives
and the object of intervention (citizen/criminal) (Rose and
Miller 1992). In penal policy, the state and non-state agents
have continuous exchanges, even if these exchanges are not
clearly specified. The relationship between the state, its
agents and agencies, and non-state actors regarding
penalty is interactive rather than unidirectional. In an era
of ‘governmentality’, power functions well beyond the figure
of the state as a unified institution. As Hall writes, the state
is a ‘network of institutions, deeply embedded within a con-
stellation of ancillary institutions associated with society and
the economic system’ (Hall 1986, 17). Agents and agencies
at a local and cellular level make sure that the broad objec-
tives of the state are fulfilled. Power is capillary (Foucault
1977/1995, 1978/1990). The use of professional healthcare
agents in the execution protocol insures the optimal func-
tioning of this new art of government.
Nursing and medical sciences are represented in prison
by the presence of trained personnel who operate the
machines and demonstrate the professional techniques used
to carry the lethal solutions to the body of the condemned.
South Dakota’s capital punishment statute states that:
An execution carried out by lethal injection shall be per-
formed by a person selected by the warden and trained
to administer the injection. The person administering the
injection need not be a physician, registered nurse or
licensed practical nurse or registered under the law of this
or any other state. (SD ST, s23A−27A-32)
Various states indemnify the healthcare personnel involved
in executing prisoners. The South Dakota statute states that
‘Any infliction of the punishment of death by administration
of the required lethal substance or substances in the manner
required by this section may not be construed to be the prac-
tice of medicine’. The South Dakota statute denies that
there is an ethical (or legal) problem in procuring health-
care professionals to insert tubes into prisoners or to obtain
the medicine (Heckler v. Chaney 1985) used to extinguish life.
Idaho’s capital punishment statute is no different:
any infliction of the punishment of death by administration
of the required lethal substance or substances in the manner
required by this section shall not be construed to be the
practice of medicine and any pharmacist or pharmaceutical
supplier is authorized to dispense drugs to the director or
his designee, without prescription, for carrying out the
provisions of this section, notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law (ID ST, s19–2716).
Kansas’s death penalty statute gives the secretary of
corrections full power to control the death process (KS ST,
s22–4001). The secretary ‘shall designate one or more execu-
tioners’ to carry out the lethal injection in a ‘swift and humane
manner’. The secretary’s discretion, however, is circumscribed
D Holmes and C Federman
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by a legal requirement to ‘appoint a panel of three persons
to advise the secretary’ on the ‘type of substance or sub-
stances to be administered’ to the condemned prisoner.
The Kansas penal authority requires scientific knowledge to
exercise its power over the condemned.
As an important part of the execution apparatus, health-
care professionals constitute a new and critical element of
social control in prison. The laws, however, hide their impor-
tance, as if to point out that the prisoner, not the doctor, is
the subject of inquiry (cf. Foucault 1977/1995, 187: ‘Disci-
plinary power … is exercised through its invisibility’).
Oklahoma’s capital punishment statute states that the
warden ‘must invite’ (to the execution) physician, the district
attorney of the county in which the crime occurred, the
judge who presided over the sentence of death, the chief
of police of the municipality in which the crime occurred,
as well as the sheriff of the county where the conviction
occurred, and the cabinet secretary of public safety (OK ST,
T. 22 s1015b). Yet even if a physician were to take part in an
execution, his or her actions would not constitute the prac-
tice of medicine, nor would the purchase of drugs needed to
administer the injection be considered lethal substances.
Delaware frankly admits that its law governing lethal injec-
tions ‘permits correctional officers to obtain controlled sub-
stances for the execution in violation of the Federal Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act … and the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act’ (DE ST, TI 11 s4209). Oregon’s
statute allows the director of corrections to purchase ‘lethal
substances’ from ‘any wholesale drug outlet … registered with
the State Board of Pharmacy’, and then states that the ‘lethal
substance or substances’ purchased ‘are not controlled sub-
stances when purchased, possessed or used for purposes of
this section’ (OR ST, s137.473(1) and (3)).
The state appropriates the nurse’s and physician’s knowl-
edge, using them like prison labor force. Others practice
their craft, use their methodologies, evoke the symbols of
their trade. But she/he cannot be named and her/his role
is unclear. Is she/he or isn’t she/he the executioner? It is as
if the laws can only recognize one subject — the convicted.
Everyone else is a spectator.
Healthcare professionals are necessary for modern-day
executions because of their status as scientists and caregivers.
Idaho’s capital punishment statute denies that administering
lethal injections constitutes the practice of medicine, and
protects against ‘unnecessary suffering’ of the condemned
by using ‘expert technical assistance’. If Idaho’s director of
the department of corrections cannot obtain expert technical
assistance to carry out the lethal injection, the method of
execution switches to firing squad (ID ST, s19–2716). Idaho
equates less scientific methods of execution with less humane
forms of execution. Utah’s death statute separates execution
by ‘shooting’, which is carried out by a ‘five-person firing
squad of peace officers’, and death by lethal injection, which
is carried out by ‘two or more persons trained in accordance
with accepted medical practices’.
‘Expert technical assistance’ over life and death is so
important that law must protect that status, regardless of who
is dispensing knowledge and exercising power. Montana’s
execution statute allows any person trained by the warden to
administer death. ‘The person administering the injection
need not be a physician, registered nurse, or licensed pra-
ctical nurse licensed or registered under the laws of this or
any other state’. Yet the ‘identity of the executioner must
remain anonymous. Facts pertaining to the selection and
training of the executioner must remain confidential’ (MT
ST, 46-19-103(6)). Healthcare personnel help make lethal
executions ‘humane’, ‘faster’, and perhaps constitutional
(Gregg v. Georgia 1976). Death penalty states appropriate
healthcare personnel to alleviate the pain of death or to
offer the illusion of alleviating pain. If punishment was
once harsh, it is now peaceful and painless. Maryland’s
penitentiary historian states that ‘the worst physical pain’
from lethal injection is ‘the prick of a needle’ (MD DOC
1999). Arizona’s historical fact sheet on the death penalty
similarly dismisses the possibility of pain from a lethal injec-
tion, and describes the pain a prisoner feels from lethal
gas as akin to a heart attack. ‘Death by lethal injection is
not painful and the inmate goes to sleep prior to the fatal
effects of the Pavulon and Potassium Chloride’ (AZ DOC
1999).
The Kansas statute makes clear that healthcare personnel
—  whether called a ‘nurse’ or a ‘physician’ — are important
because of the knowledge they have and the image they
project. Their execution activities disperse power and
responsibility throughout the prison complex, mirroring
developments in civil society regarding decentralization.
According to Bessler (1996, 709), the multilayered process
of social and coercive control regarding the means of pun-
ishment has gotten so complex that ‘no one in the entire
criminal justice system is now fully accountable for death
sentences’. Focusing on the rationalization of punishment,
Garland (1990, 182) adds that penal agents today ‘avoid the
bad conscience and cultural infamy that used to attach to the
executioner or the jailer by claiming to be more than merely
instruments of punishment.
From the standpoint of lethal injections, the ‘agent of
welfare’, in Foucault’s words, the nurse or the physician, is
less necessary than what she or he represents: the care of the
soul in the care of the state. Their purpose is to transform
executions from being terrifying to being peaceful and to
Killing for the state
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render submissive the condemned prisoner. In the process,
their work, too, is transformed. They heal by pacifying, not
correcting. Their work is legal fiction. Under a mask of care,
healthcare professionals (and the nursing and medical
technologies that surround an execution) combine part of
the state’s power and disciplinary knowledge (nursing and
medicine) in order to achieve their work. Lethal injections
are Bentham’s Panopticon. They gain in efficiency what they
lose in terror.
It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disin-
dividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a
person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, sur-
faces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mech-
anisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught
up ... Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate
the machine: in the absence of the director, his family, his
friends, his visitors, even his servants ... The Panopticon is a
marvelous machine which, whatever use one may wish to
put it to, produces homogeneous effects of power
(Foucault 1977/1995, 202).
The problem of healthcare professionals serving the
state’s end is not only an ethical one, but also a question of
the state’s use of power in rendering punishment. Foucault’s
(1977/1995, 129) description of the development of modern
prison regimes mirrors contemporary penal policy: ‘The
agent of punishment must exercise a total power, which no
third party can disturb … it must have its own functioning,
its own rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge’.
Traditionally understood, the prison, according to Sim
(1990, 9), is a ‘laboratory in which the advice and expertise
of the medical profession’ is ‘geared to reintegrating the
confined back to normality’. A prison’s medical personnel
fulfill the state’s vision of itself as a welfare state. But this is
not the only way medical knowledge is employed in prison.
It is also used to exterminate life. By the nineteenth century,
as Foucault has noted, ‘a whole army of technicians took
over’ the job of ‘the executioner, the immediate anatomist
of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psycholo-
gists, educationalists’, contributing, in their own way, to the
body of knowledge known as ‘penal practice’ (Foucault
1977/1995, 11). Nurses and physicians are part of the new
economy of punishment.
THE NEW FACES OF THE ‘BOURREAU’: 
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS, TORTURE, 
AND EXECUTIONS
Over time, the face of the executioner (bourreau) has
changed. When we think about these persons we might
imagine them wearing a hood, ‘hiding in the shadow of the
gallows’ (Farber et al. 2001; Johnson 1990, 125). In Florida,
which uses the electric chair to execute prisoners, the execu-
tioner remains hooded throughout the death process. ‘You
won’t be seeing him’, a Florida Department of Corrections
official told a journalist; ‘Not on this side of life’ ( Johnson
1990, 125).
The image of the executioner as a sinister and often solitary
person, is, of course, a holdover from earlier times, when
executions were public and executioners were scorned as
evil, contaminated by the death work that was their liveli-
hood.... They were often afforded a hood or cloak while at
work to protect their identities, which would offer them a
token shield against harm. Some of these execution tradi-
tions, or at least remnants of them, linger on even today.
Thus it is that a few states hire free-lance executioners and
engage in macabre theatrics. Executioners may be picked
up under cover of darkness at lonely country crossroads;
some still wear black hoods to hide their identity. They slip
into the prison unnoticed, do their work, then return to
their civilian lives ( Johnson 1990, 125).
Yet this is not entirely descriptive of the reality of the death
process. A review of prison literature informs us that health-
care professionals are part of the ‘execution team’ (Trevelyan
1988). The sinister figure of the hooded executioner has
been replaced by the ‘caring’ figure of a healthcare pro-
fessional. Not only do healthcare professionals participate in
the administration of the death penalty, they are involved in
the torture or corporal punishment of prisoners in other
countries (Racine-Welch and Welch 2000; Trevelyan 1988).
As violations of human rights have become more pervasive
in prisons, scientific discoveries have brought about more
sophisticated forms of torture, methods of resuscitation and
execution (ICN 1991). For example, Amnesty International
(1998, 171) reports that ‘lethal injection executions depend
on medical drugs and procedures and the potential of
this kind of execution to involve medical professionals in une-
thical behavior, including direct involvement in killing, is
clear’. In the United States, healthcare professionals’ partici-
pation in executions receives the legal protection, which
includes shielding their identity from public scrutiny.
Arizona’s capital punishment statute, which calls for ‘an
intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a
lethal quantity sufficient to cause death’, shields healthcare
personnel from legal retribution. ‘If a person who participates
or performs ancillary functions in an execution is licensed
by a board the licensing board shall not suspend or revoke
the person’s license as a result of the person’s participation
in an execution’ (ARS, 13–704; Lambright v. Lewis 1996,
arguing that lethal injections comport with societal norms).
Illinois’s statute is more explicit: ‘Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, assistance, participation in, or the perform-
ance of ancillary or other functions pursuant to this Section,
including but not limited to the administration of the lethal
D Holmes and C Federman
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substance or substances required by this Section, shall not be
construed to constitute the practice of medicine’ (ILCS, 725
5/119–5).
The state enlists healthcare professionals, mainly nurses
and physicians, to select lethal injection sites, start intrave-
nous lines to serve as ports for lethal injections, inspect, test,
or maintain lethal injection devices, consult with or super-
vise lethal injection personnel and participate directly in the
administration of the lethal solution. Healthcare knowledge
is crucial for the performance of the new killing technique
of lethal injection. This latest discovery in the killing arsenal,
which is considered more humane than electrocution
because it does less damage to the prisoner’s body, is an
obvious application of scientific (medical and para-medical)
knowledge and professional skills. Trombley (1992, 318–21)
describes the process as follows:
The inmate walks from the holding cell to the gurney,
accompanied by guards and he is placed in a supine
position on the gurney and he is strapped. Legs, abdomen,
chest … The arm that takes the IV [intravenous line] is
exposed. The nurse-anesthetist, who acts like a nurse
consultant, starts the IV. Using a number 16-gauge needle,
and a plastic catheter … [After a signal to begin] they press
the button [of the lethal injection machine].… The first
solution, sodium pentothal, goes into the person. He’s
awake, and then he goes to sleep. [After another minute]
the Pavulon … is injected, and it arrests the respiratory
muscles. Paralyze the lungs and depress the respiratory
center  … You can see the patient doing an agonal, or terminal,
breathing … Finally the potassium chloride is given and it’s
three times the lethal dose… [W]hen the prisoner had died
and had been certified as such, the nurse-anesthetist removes
the IV. Then the mortician comes in and removes him from
the gurney to his table, and takes him to the funeral parlor.
The official positions of American nursing academics
regarding capital punishment are unknown. But for the
International Council of Nurses (ICN) and the American
Nurses Association (ANA), it is clear that participation in
execution is contrary to the ‘ethical traditions of the nursing
profession’ (ANA 1995; ICN 1991). Moreover, the ANA
(1995) states that, regardless of personal opinion, nurses
who participate either directly or indirectly in legally author-
ized execution violate nursing code of ethics.
The ANA is strongly opposed to all forms of participation,
by whatever means, whether under civil or military legal
authority. Nurses should refrain from participation in capital
punishment and not take part in assessment, supervision or
monitoring of the procedure or the prisoner; procuring,
prescribing or preparing medications or solutions; inserting
the intravenous catheter; injecting the lethal solution; and
attending or witnessing the execution as a nurse. The fact
that capital punishment is currently supported in many
segments of society does not override the obligation of
nurses to uphold the ethical mandates of the profession
(ANA 1995, 2).
According to the International Council of Nurses,
nursing educators should address issues related to capital
punishment and torture. ICN (1998) advocates that all
levels of nursing education curricula include the recogni-
tion of human rights issues and violations, such as death
penalty and torture and awareness of the use of medical
technology for executions.
Jails, prisons, penitentiaries, and asylums are not just
places of social exclusion (Foucault 1977/1995; Goffman
1968). Some are places where executions are practiced. The
journey of the ‘state’s victim’ starts with the prosecution,
followed by incarceration and what Foucault (1977/1995)
calls the ‘carceral’. The subject is introduced into the carceral
machine and is later transformed into an object as he or she
goes through interventions, and corrective, disciplinary,
punitive, and educative processes. Just as the alimentary bolus
is attacked by enzymes and acids and is transformed by the
mechanical movement of different organs all the way through
its voyage into the GI tract, so too is the inmate transformed
until his/her final destination before the execution, or in
more physiological terms, his/her ‘elimination’. The last
hours of the inmate’s life are referred to as the ‘deathwatch’,
which is meticulously organized by the state’s agents.
The deathwatch is, we believe, an example of torture, as
in this last stage of the journey, the condemned experiences
multiple deaths before the ‘real’ one occurs. Critical activi-
ties during the deathwatch include ‘the prisoner’s final visit
with loved ones; a last meal; a final shower’ ( Johnson 1990,
142). During these last 24–48 h, the prisoner is transformed,
so that by the time he walks to the execution room he is
completely dehumanized. ‘The execution process today is
distinctively mechanical, impersonal, and ultimately
dehumanizing’ ( Johnson 1990, xv). Not only is the death-
watch an example of torture, the deathrow experience is a
prelude to this torturous, final stage. For Johnson (1990,
196–7), both stages are torture. According to Amnesty
International (2002, 13), torture signifies:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation
of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or confession,
punishing him for an act he has committed, or intimidating
him or other persons.
The goal of deathrow is to maintain secure physical custody
of those sentenced to death. During the deathwatch, social
control is the ultimate objective. Thus, the objectives of
deathrow and the deathwatch are different. For the latter,
‘the condemned prisoner must be under the social but not
physical, control of his keepers; he must submit to the execu-
tion routine’ (Johnson 1990, 143).
Killing for the state
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The social control imperatives during the deathwatch
have specific objectives. The condemned should be able to
enter his last walk in a dignified way without cuffs, physical
coercion, or resistance, walking almost hand in hand with his
executioners. The execution team is invested with a task that
will be attained using different forms of power (sovereign,
disciplinary, pastoral). ‘Is it not the supreme exercise of
power to get another or others to have the desires you want
them to have — that is to secure their compliance by con-
trolling their thought and desire’ (Lukes 1974, 23). No reason
for physical violence, no resistance; the condemned has
been made ready to die in the way that his executioners had
planned. Through the torturous journey of the deathwatch,
within the carceral machine, the sentenced one becomes
calm, obedient, docile, and disciplined: the objective is
achieved.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a duality: the conflict in
American prisons between nursing ethics and the killing
machinery. The US penal system is a setting in which trained
healthcare personnel practice the extermination of life.
Moreover, we looked upon the sanitization of deathwork as
an application of healthcare professionals’ skills and knowl-
edge and their appropriation by the state to serve its ends. A
review of the states’ death penalty statutes shows that health-
care workers are involved in the capital punishment process
and shielded by American laws (and to a certain extent by
nursing boards through their inaction). We have demon-
strated how the law’s language often masks that involve-
ment; and how the states further that duplicity behind legal
formalisms. Legal formalism is only a screen and an obstacle
for what Foucault terms ‘pouvoir/savoir’: ‘Every pro-
gramme … either articulates or presupposes a knowledge
of the field of reality upon which it is to intervene and/or
which it is calculated to bring into being’ (Foucault 1980,
248). Lethal injection is to the twentieth century what the
guillotine was to the Enlightenment. The guillotine was the
‘perfect vehicle’ for Enlightenment principles. ‘Contact
between the law, or those who carry it out, and the body of
the criminal, is reduced to a split second. There is no physi-
cal confrontation; the executioner need be no more than a
meticulous watchmaker’ (Foucault 1977/1995, 13).
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